The Role of the State in China's Industrial Development: a Reassesment by Gabriele, Alberto
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Role of the State in China’s
Industrial Development: a Reassesment
Alberto Gabriele
Unctad, Geneva
5. April 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14551/
MPRA Paper No. 14551, posted 9. April 2009 00:34 UTC
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN CHINA'S 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: A REASSESSMENT 
 
 
ALBERTO GABRIELE1 
UNCTAD, GENEVA 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this paper, we argue that the role of the State (to be understood as a holistic 
term referring to the public  sector as whole), far from being withering out, is in fact 
massive, dominant, and crucial to China's industrial development. Actually, it has 
been strengthened by the successful implementation of the "keep the big dump the 
small" policy, which in turn is consistent with a more general strategy shift towards 
re-centralization in many areas of economic and social policies. This trend that not 
only is still going on, but is inevitably bound to be further accelerated by the massive  
package of fiscal and other interventions made necessary as a response to the world 
financial and economic crisis. 
 
State-owned and state-holding enterprises are now less numerous, but much 
larger, more capital- and knowledge-intensive, more productive and more profitable 
than in the late 1990s. Contrary to popular belief, especially since the mid-2000s, their 
performance in terms of efficiency and profitability compares favourably with that of 
private enterprises. The state-controlled sub-sector constituted by state-holding 
enterprises, in particular, with at its core the 149 large conglomerates managed by 
SASAC, is clearly the most advanced component of China's industry and the one 
where the bulk of in-house R&D activities take place.  
 
The role of the public sector, moreover, goes beyond that of those enterprises 
which are owned or controlled by the State. In the specific Chinese context, many of 
the most advanced formally private industrial enterprises are in fact related to the 
public domain by a web of ownership, financial, and other linkages, to an extent  that 
is qualitatively different and deeper than that of their counterparts in capitalist 
countries. The role public sector is paramount in engineering an extraordinary boom 
in S&T and R&D activities (both inside the industrial sector and outside, in 
universities and research centers), and in fuelling a massive investment drive aimed at 
enhancing China's infrastructural and human capital environment. These processes 
also generate major systemic external economies, which are reaped by public and 
private enterprises alike, contributing to abating their operative costs and to sustain 
their competitiveness and profitability. 
 
Contrary to many other analysts, we do not view the dominant role of the state 
in China's industry (and, more generally, in China's economy) as a possibly necessary 
- albeit wasteful - evil, which will be superseded once the transition from a centrally-
planned to a fully capitalist modern economy will be completed. We rather see it as a 
primitive, embryonic, ever-evolving but permanent form of strategic planning aimed 
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at fostering industrial development, and as a key distinctive, structural, and pioneering 
characteristic of market socialism. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The unprecedented boom of China's economy has been interpreted by many 
orthodox analysts more or less as follows. Domestic markets have been almost fully 
liberalized, first in agriculture and then in industry and services. Previously- 
collectivized land has been given back to peasants households. Most industrial and 
services enterprises are privately-owned, and now produce the bulk of GDP, due 
mainly to their superior efficiency with respect to SOEs (see Dougherty et. al. 2008). 
The country also opened up to international trade, and even joined the WTO, thereby 
boosting labor-intensive exports and acceding foreign, advanced knowledge, thanks to 
FDI spillovers. In sum, there is nothing so special about China, apart from its size that 
ensures a virtually unlimited supply of cheap, unskilled labor to fuel export-oriented 
industrialization. Yes, relatively egalitarian land distribution, widespread literacy, and 
an innate, culture-based attitude towards thrift also help. However, the bottom line is 
that China is just one more developing country that is prospering since it traded its 
obsolete socialist model to embrace capitalism. 
 
Other, more acute observers do acknowledge the depth of the structural 
differences between China and "normal" capitalist countries, but dismiss the 
applicability of the term "socialism" as a useful tool to analyze such a strange animal.  
 
Lindbeck (2008), for instance, argues that  "the bulk of production today takes 
place in private firms"  and "most prices in China are today formed  on market, the 
main exceptions being  natural resources and public utilities. Moreover, the label 
"socialism" is not usually associated with a strong reliance on economic incentives, 
competition, internationalization and (as in China) an apparent neglect of the  
distribution…of income, education and welfare" . Therefore, both terms as "state 
capitalism" and "market socialism" are inappropriate, and the neutral term "mixed 
economy" should rather be utilized to characterize China's economic system.   
 
Lindbeck is right  when referring to the contradictions between China's present 
social reality and the traditional goals of socialism, which are particularly stark in the  
domain of income and social inequalities (see, for instance, Kanbur R., Quian Y., and 
Zhang X., 2008). Yet, in the present paper we are focusing on some positive (i.e. 
objective) features of China's economic system, rather than on the country's social 
problems seen in2 a normative, teleological dimension. In this context, we show that 
Lindbeck's view amounts to a severe underestimation of the role of the State in 
China's economy, and to an overestimation of the relative autonomy and supposed 
commanding position of unplanned, market-based regulatory mechanisms. Thus, we 
consider it as appropriate to retain the term "market socialism", even if it has to be 
taken with a pinch of salt and to some extent as ad hoc definition1.  
 
The crucial differences between a "market socialist" and a capitalist system are 
two. The first one is that in a market socialist system the role of the State is both 
quantitatively larger and qualitatively superior, thereby allowing the public sector as a 
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whole to exert an overall strategic control over the country's development path, 
especially in crucial areas such as setting the economy-wide rate of the accumulation 
and determining the speed and direction of technical progress. 
 
 The second difference is that in a market socialist system, although capitalists 
endowed with private ownership rights on some means of production do exist, they 
are not strong enough to constitute a hegemonic and dominant social class, as it 
happens in "normal" capitalist countries (see Gabriele and Schettino 2008). 
 
This paper focuses on China's industrial sector. In order to confute the myth of 
an industrial sector in China which would by now be fully capitalist in everything but 
in name, dominated by domestic and foreign private investors, the paper provides 
both quantitative and qualitative evidence showing that the State exerts full strategic 
control on China's industrial development. The Chinese state employs as an important 
but not unique tool its ownership and control rights on the largest and most advanced 
industrial enterprises. However, thanks to its unique degree of control on the country's 
resources, it also engages in huge and ever-increasing investments in infrastructure, 
institution- and human capital building, R&D, and in other areas, on a scale 
unequalled anywhere else in the world. This public investment drive generates a 
network of systemic external economies2, which in turn decisively enhance the 
competitiveness, productivity and profitability of both public and privately 
owned/controlled industrial enterprises. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews part of a sprawling 
literature on SOEs' reforms and their relative efficiency and profitability, focusing 
mainly on studies which covered the 1990s and the early 2000s, and showing that 
some more recent contributions suggest that major improvement were beginning to 
become apparent by the mid-2000s.  
 
Sections3 and 4 presents some statistical evidence on China's industrial 
enterprises and R&D activities. We show that the role of public industry has been 
changing but is far from marginal. The performance of public industry in China has 
improved dramatically in recent years, and is likely to do so even more in relative 
terms in the near future, due to the  collapse of large sections  of small-scale, export-
oriented manufacturing private firms.  Moreover, it has to be taken into account that 
the impact of China's extraordinary R&D effort, the bulk of which is conducted either 
in large state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises or in public universities 
and research centers, has important implications for evaluating the overall 
contribution of the State to industrial development.  
Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
2. A review of the literature  
 
China's industrial scenario, previously  dominated by traditional state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), has been profoundly modified, first by the surge of  township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) in the 1970s and 1980s, and subsequently by the boom of  
private and foreign-funded enterprises. The latter presently constitute the vast 
majority of firms and generate the bulk of industrial employment.3 
  4 
 
These trends should not unwarrantedly lead to underestimate the evolving but 
still crucial role of the state in China's industrial development. Subsequent rounds of  
SOE reforms have been  going on in China since the 1980s. However, the 
governments' political willingness to accept the social and political costs of radically 
reforming state enterprises strengthened progressively during the 1990s and the early 
2000s, and a major turnaround in the performance of state-owned and state-holding 
firms has become apparent in the second half of the present decade.  
 
Numerous studies analyzed different aspects of SOE reforms in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. With some significant exceptions, the majority of them tended to 
acknowledge that important changes were going on and steps forward were being 
made, but concluded that results were failing short of expectations  and no decisive 
breakthrough in SOEs' performance was being achieved.  
 
Zheng et al (2000) analyzed SOEs' productivity performance over the 1980-
1994 period. They found that productivity did grow, thanks mainly to technical 
progress, but technical efficiency remained low. Dong and Putterman (2003) argued 
that hardening budget constraints without relieving SOEs from their social burdens 
caused a scarcity of non-labor inputs and thus rising redundant labor in the early 
1990s. Cull and Xu (2003) found that bank finance -  as  an alternative to other 
sources of funding such as retained profits or direct  state transfers - had a positive 
impact on firms' profitability and on managerial flexibility in the 1980s, but this 
association  had been weakening in the early 1990s. Zhang (2004) reviewed the 
effects of  corporatization and stock market listing on SOEs' performance, identifying 
a rapid trend towards firms' concentration and consolidation, but concluded that  
results  in terms of performance were still modest on balance. 
 
Other studies compared the performances of public and private enterprises. 
Most of them found that private firms performed better (see Chen(2001), Gul and 
Zhao (2001), Sun and Tong (2003), Wei and Varela (2003), Hovey (2005), while 
others were inconclusive  or did not find a systemic relationship between ownership 
and firms' behaviour (Wang 2005).  
 
Zhang, Y., and D Parker (2004) analyzed TFP trends in China's Electronics 
Industry in the 1990s', and found that corporatised SOEs did not perform significantly 
better than traditional ones, with TFP4 growing but at a slower pace than in both 
collective and private electronic firms. Most researchers, however,  found that  legal 
person holdings  have appositive impact (see Sun and Tong (2003), Wong et 
al.(2004). In a more recent study, Hovey and Naughton (2007) reached similar 
conclusions: "state ownership per se(is) negatively correlated with performance", 
while " legal persons  … have a positive influence on firm performance or value" 
(p.139).  On this basis, they put forward policy recommendations favouring various 
forms of divesture of state ownership in existing SOEs, some of which amount to a 
transformation of traditional SOEs into state-holding legal persons. 
 
Other recent studies have identified serious weaknesses in reformed SOEs 
persisting  well into the 2000s.  Girma and Gong (2008), on the basis of a  large micro 
data set  investigate whether SOEs in China have benefited from the managerial, 
technical and organizational skills possessed by multinational firms operating in the 
country, and conclude that  evidence in favor of positive spillovers is weak, due 
mainly to scarce regional linkages and low level of absorptive capacity. The latter, in 
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turn, was partly caused by a still-undeveloped structure of managers' incentives.  Yu 
and Nikamp(2008) assess the comparative productivity performance of SOEs in high-
tech industries from 1996 to 2006. They find that SOEs as a whole experienced an 
unsatisfactory trajectory of catch-up for 1996-2006, with SOEs gaining ground in 
1997-2003, but falling further behind foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs)5 in 2003-
2006, due to their inadequate capability to develop indigenous technologies.6 . These 
results (to be taken as indicative, due to some debatable features of the authors' 
methodology) might be due in part to the disruptive short-term effects of the major 
acceleration in SOEs' reform which started in 2003, as shown by Dong and Xu 
(2008). The authors analyze econometrically the short-term impact of China's major 
labour restructuring program, which was much more widespread among public-owned 
rather than private enterprises, and especially in older and  SOEs  with higher excess 
capacity. Their most interesting finding is that, far from automatically improve 
performance and profitability, "downsizing has serious short-term costs in terms of 
total factor productivity (TFP)", due largely to its "psychological" costs in terms of 
workers' demoralization.7 They also found that "private firms tend to have worse 
allocation efficiency after downsizing but tend to cut wages to a greater extent such 
that profitability is unaffected, and SOEs tend to have slightly milder deterioration in 
allocating efficiency, and tend to cut wages to a lesser extent as well… SOEs have a 
more positive ‘catch-up’ effect from downsizing, and …tend to be more protective of 
labour." (p.238). Dong and Xu's results   contribute to explain why  improvements  in  
the performance of state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises (SOSHEs)8 
did not become apparent until the mid-2000s, while the bulk of labour shedding took 
place in late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Another recent contribution reaching drastic conclusions on the superiority of 
private enterprises is that of Dougherty et al. (2008). The authors provide a 
quantitative  analysis based on a large sample made up by quarter of a million 
industrial firm, and conclude that   " … the private sector…  operates much more 
efficiently than the public sector" (p.309). However, their argument is flawed, due to 
various methodological and interpretative problems which are analyzed to some 
length in the Appendix attached to this paper. 
 
Since the early-to-mid 200s has been on the ascendance a discordant  strand of 
literature, which tends to be more optimistic on the results of past SOEs reforms and  
to deny the intrinsic superiority of private ownership of industrial enterprises.  Some 
of these studies focus on the interaction between SOEs reforms and China's 
mushrooming R&D activities, analyzing various aspects of China's national system of 
innovation (NSI), which has been booming at a historically unprecedented pace and is 
now the second largest in the world in terms of R&D expenditure (see Mandel 2006,  
McGregor 2007, OECD 2008a,b, Gabriele and Khan 2008).  
 
China's NSI is characterized by specific forms of interaction involving  public 
universities and research centres, public enterprises,  privately owned and foreign-
funded  industrial firms ( see, among others,  Gabriele and Khan 2008,  Mazzoleni 
(2008), Niosi 2008).  However, even in this flexible, rapidly evolving, and ever-
changing context, the role of public organizations remains paramount, especially 
taking into account that most university-affiliated enterprises are ultimately state-
owned9.  
 
In-house R&D activities on the part of public enterprises are a crucial 
component of any NSI, as they constitute a key linkage between the creation of 
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knowledge and its productive application.  Hu and Jefferson (2004) found high 
returns to R&D among Beijing's SOEs in the 1990s. However, they also found that 
R&D expenditures was increasing less than proportionately with firm size, suggesting 
a less than optimal propensity to invest in R&D on the part of SOEs.  Hu, Jefferson,  
and Jinchang (2005) showed that in-firm R&D was crucial to  "complement 
technology transfer—whether of domestic or foreign origin"(p.780). Hu and Jefferson 
(2005) argued that, without underestimating  the positive impact of  the surge in 
indigenous R&D, China's patent explosion in the early 2000s was mainly due to legal 
and institutional changes in the competition conditions prevailing in the domestic 
market, which had been favouring patent holders and  strengthened  intellectual 
property rights protection. It was particularly the competitive challenge of FFEs, 
along with that stemming from the industry's shift towards a high degree of export-
orientation, which was "prompting domestic Chinese firms to file for more patent 
applications for their strategic competitive value."  The case of patents is an example 
of a wider trend towards deepening linkages between international trade opening and 
technological change: "The export economy is best understood as a big technology-
transfer machine…Exports contribute to technology transfer in two ways...One is to 
compel exporting firms to keep up with global technology trends, the other is the role 
played by FFEs in enhancing in-bound technology flows" (Kroeber 2008). 
 
Another form of  interaction between  economic and scientific human and 
non-human assets, in a framework characterized jointly by China's indigenous drive 
towards technological development and by the profit-oriented strategies of foreign 
investors,  is the increasing propension to establish R&D centers in Beijing on the part 
of many leading TNCs (Chen 2008).  Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Ma, and Xu (2006)  
found that both  domestic (such as increasing R&D activities and enterprise reforms) 
and externally-originated factors (technology imports) contribute to  an energy-saving 
bias in China's technological development. In-house R&D activities are crucial to 
enable firms to develop the absorptive capacity needed for the diffusion of imported 
technologies. Their findings "underscore the importance of diverse channels of 
technical change in driving the economic growth and development of China with 
likely implications for other developing countries. "( pp.659-670). Fisher-Vanden and  
Jefferson (2008) found that in-house R&D is  labour- and material-using and capital- 
and energy-saving, thereby capitalizing on China's comparative advantage, and is 
mainly aimed at slashing production costs of already-existing products. Conversely, 
imported technologies, which are comparatively capital-intensive, focus on new 
product development: "These diversified channels of technical change reveal a pattern 
of technical change in  a developing country context that is far more diversified than 
that suggested by the conventional growth literature (Fisher-Vanden and  Jefferson 
2008, p.658) 10 
 
Other authors analyzed comparatively the performance of public and privately 
owned/controlled industrial enterprises. Holz (2002) showed that the gap between 
SOEs and non-SOEs was not due to the formers' intrinsic inefficiency, and could  be 
explained simply by SOEs'  higher circulation tax rates and capital intensity. Qiu,   
Aivazian, and Ge ( 2005a,b) found that  restructuring according to corporate law 
improved firms' governance in the late 1990s, and argued that full privatization was 
not needed to effectively improve SOEs' performance. Chang (2008) analyzed   the 
diversification of large SOEs in Lanzhou, and concluded that the process was subject 
to market conditions and firm-specific factors, yet the government played a key 
enabling role in the reorganisation and diversification process.  
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In order to interpreter these  findings, it is important to  evaluate them in the 
context of the major reform drive which has been going on in China's industrial sector  
at least since the mid-1990s, but accelerated dramatically during the 2000s. Since the 
late 1990s, private firms have boomed, rapidly overcoming public industry in terms of 
number, employment and - to a lesser extent - share of total industrial output.  SOEs' 
numbers, conversely, were drastically downsized, and so did their workforce11, 
consistently with the thrust of the zhuada fangxiao (keep the big dump the small) 
policy12. A key result of SOEs' reforms has been a major turnaround in profitability. 
By the mid-1990s, SOEs' losses were so high that net profits were less than 0.6% of 
GDP. By 2007, the picture had changed drastically, with profits reaching 4.2% of 
GDP in industrial  SOSHEs13,14 and 2% of GDP in non-industrial SOEs (Naughton 
2008).15 
 
A major role in this recovery has been played by the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The Commission was created 
in 2002 to represent central-government shareholder interests in large enterprise 
groups, the number of which is now 14916 after having been reduced through mainly 
vie merger operations. After reorganizations17, SASAC-managed firms become joint 
stock corporations or wholly-owned state corporations18. SASAC acts mainly as the 
facilitator and promoter of the effective implementation of reforms which had been 
officially launched already in the 1990s, but had not been carried out thoroughly until 
the political will to get rid of loss-making SOEs became evident, and state support 
was drastically focused on a limited number of large and ever-growing firms. Public 
enterprises are now concentrated in few strategic sectors: energy and power, industrial 
raw materials, military industry and large-scale machinery-building, transport and 
telecommunications. Some of these sectors are explicitly reserved to state firms; while 
in others spontaneous market forces and regulatory discrimination combine to erect 
very high barriers to entry for private operators. In both cases, however, the 
government has strived to avoid the creation of monopolies, rather engineering the 
emergence of oligopolistic market structures in which typically two or three large 
public firms compete with each other.19 
 
Moreover, during the present decade, two other major and only apparently 
contradictory policy trends have become increasingly apparent. One is a tendency 
towards  re-centralization (pursued also in domains different from that of industrial 
policies, as shown by the key 1994 tax reform), which continues unabated  and cannot 
but be further strengthened by the drastic interventions need to control the exogenous 
impact of the world financial and economic crisis. The other is the adoption of 
leverage and of a rationalized hierarchical chain20 as an effective means to maintain 
state control under a diversified ownership structure.21   
 
Many analysts have been caught wrong-footed by the speed and depth of the 
changes taking place in China's industrial landscape, where they saw only a 
spectacular private-led entrepreneurial unfolding, and concluded that  SOEs' assets 
were being privatized at an accelerated pace and the  State's presence in China's 
industry was withering away. A very different view is put forward by Kroeber 
2008)22: "This privatization story exists in defiance of experience: in virtually all 
industrial sectors state firms play a significant or dominant role…. More than 70% of 
all China's enterprises are now private, and they have contributed to compensate both 
job losses in the public sector and to net job creation in urban areas. Yet, economic 
power remains firmly concentrated in the hands of the state"" Similarly, Wildau 
(2008) states that "the state's command over key economic levers is as strong as ever. 
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The state has retreated from highly competitive, low-margin manufacturing and 
service industries, but has kept tight grip over a wide range of critical industries 
generating large cash flows ".  
 
Moreover, it should also be taken into account that the true scope of state 
intervention in China's industry goes well beyond the boundaries of SOSHEs Even 
the most advanced among nominally private enterprises are often connected to the 
public sector through a number of ownership, finance, and other linkages, to a much 
larger extent than their counterparts in capitalist countries. A case in point is that of 
Huawei, a very successful and dynamic producer of telecoms network equipment with 
sales of about US$15 bn in 2008. According to Cartlidge (2008), "... Huawei, 
nominally a private company, has received massive state support both at home and 
abroad… It is frequently asked whether Huawei acts purely from commercial moti-
vations, or if it is an agent of broader state policies. ..Huawei is in fact far more 
Chinese than an ordinary TNCs, and its recent actions fit nicely in China's recent 
pendulum shift towards a revamped support for key state-owned enterprises23…the 
last few years have also seen increased support for a smaller group of some 40-50 of 
the country’s biggest state firms. Huawei, ostensibly private, does not formally belong 
to this group, but seems to enjoy similar benefits". ther similar cases of leading 
formally private companies which are in fact largely connected to public institutions 
are those of the white goods company Hai’er, that is now controlled by Qingdao city 
SASAC, and that of the computer firm Legend, the biggest shareholder of which is 
the China Academy of Sciences (see Naughton 2008). 
 
Finally, a particularly interesting contribution is that of Chen, Firth, and Xu 
(2009), who analyze a sample of listed companies with different types of ownership, 
to evaluate their relative efficiency. Their results show that the group of 157 large 
enterprises controlled by SASAC, which they call SOEs affiliated to the central 
government (SOECGs)24, " excel in almost every way when compared to other 
ownership types", while mixed enterprises controlled by private investors do not 
perform particularly well, contrasting "the claims that firms perform best when the 
state is completely absent from ownership …at least in the case of China". (p.172).  
 
The authors interpreter their results -which are entirely consistent with our 
own findings presented below in section 3 - as follows: "In a transitional economy 
with a weak legal environment, the governance mechanisms of state and private 
ownership are different from those in either a planned economy or a developed 
market economy. We find that commercialized state ownership has its advantages in 
these circumstances. Thus, certain types of state ownership can be superior to private 
ownership when the institutional environment is relatively underdeveloped and when 
law enforcement is capricious and weak…. We document an alignment effect where 
higher ownership of the dominant shareholder is associated with better firm 
performance."  We agree with the last point, but in our view the rest of this argument 
is flawed, as it unwarrantedly assumes that private ownership would be superior in a 
fully developed legal and institutional context. On the contrary, our view is that 
China's SASAC-controlled elite enterprises are pioneering a form of ownership and 
management structure which has a good chance to  prove  itself the most suitable to 
deal with the challenges of industrial development in the XXI century, also in the 
most advanced technological and institutional contexts.  
 
 
 
  9 
3. SOEs, State-holding mixed enterprises and private enterprises:  
 
Public industry in China, as in any other country, is constituted by industrial 
enterprises which are controlled by non-private legal entities (be them the State, local 
governments, or groups of workers25). The state-controlled sector of industry is 
constituted by two components: SOEs and state-holding enterprises (mixed 
enterprises in which the State holds a majority share). Besides them, there is another, 
smaller category of non-state public enterprises. Most of them are local cooperatives 
and collectives, many of which are small-scale and are located in rural areas.  
 
Adding up all public-owned and public-controlled categories of enterprises, it 
is possible to gauge the relative weight of the public sector in China's industry.26 This 
weight has been shrinking fast over the present decade, especially due to the relative 
decline of TVEs27, collectives, and cooperatives, and to  the parallel correspondent 
emergence of a growing number of domestic private enterprises (see table 1). 
 
In 1998, SOSHEs were still almost 40% of all industrial enterprises, owned 
70% of the assets, produced half of the national industrial output and employed 60% 
of the workforce. SOSHEs' relative weight declined over all these three dimensions, 
but in an uneven fashion. As a result, by 2007, SOSHEs were only 6% of all industrial 
enterprises, while (domestic) private enterprises were more than half of the total. Yet, 
SOSHEs employed over 20% of the industrial workforce, produced almost 30% of the 
output, detained over 40% of industrial assets and generated 40% of the sector's 
profits. SOEs proper were less than 3% of all industrial enterprises, producing about 
9% of total gross industrial output value (GVIO) and employing 8% of the sector's 
workforce (see Tables 1, 2).   
 
However, such a reduced but still sizeable relative weight tells only a rather 
small part of the story. To evaluate thoroughly the role of the public sector in China's 
industry it is necessary to examine a number of economic and financial statistical 
indicators relative to its three components: SOEs, non-state public enterprises, and 
s.Mtate-holding enterprises. In turn, these figures shall be compared to the 
correspondent ones for the various components of privately-controlled industrial 
enterprises. To this purpose, data on various groupings of industrial enterprises from 
China's Statistical Yearbook 2008 (CSY 2008) have been aggregated and decomposed 
in order to offer a clearer picture of the public/private relation in China's industry. 
Indicators of productivity, capitalization, profit-generating capability, profitability, 
and efficiency, have also been calculated for each group of enterprises (see table 3). 
The indicators are as follows. The O/L ratio (where O is the GVIO and L is the 
average number of workers) is the labour productivity indicator.  The K/L ratio (with 
A representing the assets endowment) is the capitalization indicator. The P/L ratio 
(with P representing profits) - i.e., the level of profit generated by each worker - is the 
profit-generating capability indicator. The P/K ratio is the profitability indicator. K/O, 
the capital/ output ratio, is a rough indicator of efficiency in terms of "capital 
productivity".28  
 
Data in table 3 show that SOEs are on average much larger and capital-
intensive than most other Chinese industrial enterprises. With respect to the national 
averages for the entire industrial sector29, SOEs' per employee asset endowment is 
about double, while labor productivity is only slightly higher (Table 3, row 1). Thus, 
SOEs' workers utilize on average twice as much capital than the industry's average, 
but do not translate this advantage into a correspondent productivity gain. SOEs' 
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profitability is also lower than the national industrial average, both in per employee 
and in per unit of capital terms. Therefore, SOEs do not appear to be among China's 
most efficient and profitable industrial enterprises.  
 
However, this conclusion is a at best a very tentative one, due mainly to two 
main reasons. One is simply that the explanatory power of rough aggregate indicators 
such as those presented in the last five columns of Table 3 should not be overstated.  
The other is that this caveat is more significant in the case of SOEs than in that of all 
the other groupings of industrial enterprises, because many SOEs are large 
infrastructural firms. They operate in sectors  which are intrinsically capital-intensive 
and whose markets  are characterized by a high degree of monopoly, therefore they 
are subject to particularly stringent price and operational regulations. As a result, 
estimates of SOEs' productivity and profitability and are prone to be affected by 
particularly severe biases. The sign of the bias, more over, cannot be known with 
certainty either. In fact, it is likely that many monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic 
SOEs providing basic public services are mandated by regulations to charge 
consumers prices lower than those which would prevail if these enterprises were 
privately-owned. These SOEs' productivity and profitability might look poor if judged 
at market prices, even if they are actually very well-managed, efficient, and socially 
useful enterprises. But in other cases, central and local governments may choose to 
avoid the bankruptcy of truly inefficient SOEs, providing them ad-hoc fiscal 
advantages, and/or applying lax regulatory norms that allow these firms to charge 
very high prices. In those cases, productivity and profitability indicators might 
actually underestimate the gravity of SOEs' true situation.  
 
Adding to SOEs two other minor state-controlled, fully public-owned 
categories of enterprises, State Sole funded Corporations and State Joint Ownership 
Enterprises, we obtain the category of State Enterprises (total) (Table 3, row 2). As 
the weight of State Sole funded Corporations and State Joint Ownership Enterprises is 
very small in comparison with that of SOEs, the indicators relative to State 
Enterprises (total) do not differ markedly from those relative to SOEs. 
 
Conversely, the picture of another category of fully-public industrial 
enterprises, that of Fully Public Non-State Enterprises (FPubNSEs, essentially 
constituted by cooperatives and collectives), is very different from that of SOEs 
(Table 3, row 3). They are the smallest group of firms in terms of average labour force 
size, the most undercapitalized and those that generate the smaller amount of profits 
per employee. Yet, they have the lowest capital/output ratio and the higher 
profits/assets ratio. These small and very light public enterprises occupy a segment of 
the industry that is virtually at the opposite side from that of SOEs, and utilize their 
scarce assets in a quite efficient and profitable way.  However, their overall weight in 
China's industrial scenario is very limited, not only in terms of output but also in 
terms of employment.  
 
The most advanced component of public industry is constituted by state-
holding mixed enterprises (SHMEs). In SHMEs, the State owns a larger share than 
any other share-holder, thereby effectively being able to exercise strategic control. 
These enterprises are not formally very different from those state-controlled mixed 
enterprises which are still common (even if much less than a few decades ago 2008) 
in many capitalist countries.  Yet, in the Chinese context, their role is far more crucial, 
both in quantitatively and in qualitative terms. 
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SHMEs are few: they are only 2.7% of all industrial enterprises, a share even 
smaller than that of SOEs. Yet, they employ over 9% of the  labour force, own over  
20% of total assets, produce almost 16% of the  output and generate almost a quarter 
of all industrial profits. SHMEs are large, capital-intensive, and very profitable, as 
confirmed by the very high levels of their profits/worker and profits/assets ratios. 
Both profitability indicators are superior to those of any other large grouping of either 
public or private industrial enterprises (see Table 3, row 10). SHMEs lead also in 
terms of labour productivity. This indicator stood at 880300 Yuan on average in 2007, 
almost 60% higher than that of SOEs and extra-regional FDI-funded enterprises30, 
and also more than double that of domestic private enterprises and that of private-
controlled mixed enterprises. 
 
SHMEs' capital/output ratio, while lower than that of SOEs, is higher than 
those of all private and privately-controlled enterprises.31  However, we have already 
found that the enterprise grouping exhibiting the lowest K/O ratio is that of non-state 
public industry. It is not surprising, after all, that poorly capitalized, small-scale 
enterprises exhibit a very favourable K/O ratio: it is still possible for a firm (although 
unlikely in the modern industrial sector) to produce some output, and to realize a 
profit, utilizing only labour. Such a hypothetical enterprise would exhibit a zero K/O 
ratio, but would hardly   represent a model for industrialization and technical 
progress. These findings show that SHMEs are, as a group, the most advanced 
component of China's industry, and suggest that the drastically-implemented zhuada 
fangxiao strategy has been rather successful so far. 
 
Turning the focus on China's private industrial sector, the first point to note is 
that it is quite heterogeneous, as it is   composed by four quite uneven categories of 
enterprises: domestic private enterprises (DPrivEs); private-controlled mixed 
enterprises (PrivMEs); enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
(HKMTEs); foreign-funded enterprises, owned by investors from countries different 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (FFEs). The latter two categories of enterprises 
jointly constitute the group of FDI-funded enterprises (FDIEs)  (See table 3, rows 6, 
and 9, and Table 4) 
 
DPrivEs are now over half of the total, employ over ¼ of the industrial labour 
force, produce almost ¼ of total output. They own only about 17% of industrial assets 
and generate a slightly higher fraction of total profits. DPrivEs ' labour productivity is 
almost identical to that of their similarly small and undercapitalized public 
counterpart constituted by cooperatives and collectives, and much lower than that of 
all other categories of industrial enterprises. With respect to profitability, DPrivEs   
fare poorly in terms of profit/worker, but lead in terms of profit/asset ratio32. DPrivEs' 
K/O ratio is also the lowest of all groupings of industrial enterprises. Yet, it is very 
similar to that of cooperatives and collectives33. The latter finding shows that 
DPrivEs' apparent efficiency in utilizing physical capital to produce industrial goods 
is not stemming from a supposed intrinsic superiority of private property, but simply 
by the very low K/L ratios which is a common characteristic of both DPrivEs and 
FPubNSEs.34 In sum, DPrivEs   are comparatively  small and undercapitalized, and 
their most valuable  contribution to China's overall economic and social development  
so far is that of creating and maintaining a sizeable share of  total employment, 
utilizing relatively few physical and financial resources (see Table 3, row 6, and table 
4). 
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PrivMEs share a number of characteristics with the state-controlled section of 
mixed enterprises. As such, they are larger and more capital intensive than PrivDEs. 
They are about 15% of all enterprises, and contribute to about 10% of total industrial 
capitalization, output, and profits, and to almost 15% of the employment. However, 
on average, privately-controlled mixed enterprises lag behind their state-owned 
counterparts, as shown by size, labor productivity, capitalization, and profitability 
indicators. As they are less capital-intensive, however, PrivMEs perform better than 
SHMEs in terms of  K/O ratios (see table 3, row 11, and Table 4). 
 
The two groups of FDI-funded enterprises are quite different from each other. 
HKMEs are mostly constituted by small and medium-sized firms exhibiting a 
behavior very similar to privately-controlled domestic mixed enterprises. They are 
about 10% of the total and contribute   a roughly similar share of assets, output, and 
profits. Their contribution to total employment is higher (15%). HKMEs' productivity 
and profitability indicators are strikingly similar to those of PrivMEs (see table 4). 
Conversely, as most FFEs are controlled by large TNCs originating from advanced 
capitalist countries, they are more capital intensive than HKMEs,  and their labour 
productivity is higher, as well as their  contribution to total industrial capitalization, 
output and profits. However, the two sub-groups of FDI-funded enterprise do not 
differ much in terms of P/K and K/O ratios (see table 4).    
 
Table 5 complements the preceding  findings, showing data and indicators on 
China's industrial enterprises classified by scale and comparing them with those of 
SOSHEs. Each size-based category - large (LEs), medium (MEs), and small (SEs) 
enterprises - produces about 1/3 of China's total industrial output. However, LEs are 
less than  3000, while MEs and SEs are about  ten times and one hundred times as 
numerous. Of course, LEs are more capitalized and have higher labor productivity  
than MEs and SEs, but their superiority is even more remarkable in terms of 
profitability: LEs' profits/worker  ratio is about double that of MEs and three times 
higher than that of SEs.  SOSHEs' indicators are similar to those of LEs. This is 
probably due to the fact that most SOSHEs  are medium-sized, but the largest ones are 
super-large. However, SOSHEs' degree of capitalization is higher than that of LEs. 
More importantly, the last two rows of table 5 confirm that there are significant  
differences in performance between SOEs and SHMEs 35. With respect to the national 
average, SOEs are much more  capitalized (their A/L ratio is almost double), yet  their  
productivity and profitability are only slightly higher. This finding confirms that 
SOEs proper, at least to some extent, still come short of exploiting fully their 
preferential access to capital. Conversely, SHMEs are only marginally more 
capitalized than SOEs, but their productivity and profitability indicators are far 
superior, suggesting that  their organizational, managerial, and ownership structures 
are indeed more advanced and effective.  
 
 
4. The role of public enterprises in China's research effort 
 
Until the mid-1990s, China's research effort was still very modest, even in 
purely quantitative terms. In the second part of the decade, however, all S&T and 
R&D indicators started to skyrocket. In 1996-2000 period, S&T expenditure more 
than doubled36  and the share of GDP devoted to R&D activities (R&D/GDP ratio) 
increased sharply, from 0.6% to 1% (see CSY 2008, Table 20.44). Research output 
indicators also exhibited a sustained increase: certified patent applications, for 
instance, more than doubled (see CSY 2008, Table 20.38 and 20.44).37  
  13 
 
The upward trend continued in the 2000s, at a pace unequalled anywhere else 
in the world (see Gabriele and Khan 2008). During a period of exceptionally fast 
economic growth, the R&D/GDP ratio kept climbing, reaching 1.13% in 2003 and 
almost 1.5% ( a figure much higher than that of many OECD countries) in 2007.  
Taking into account the scale effects stemming both from China's unique size and 
from the speed of its GDP growth, these indicators show that the sheer expansion of 
China's R&D human and material resources  has been historically unprecedented, and 
according to some quantitative indicators (such as the number of scientists, engineers, 
and other S&T and R%D personnel) have already reached. closely approached, or 
surpassed those of the US. One of the most recent estimates  (OECDb 2008) puts the 
number of full time researchers in 2007 at  1 387 882 for the US  and 1 223 756 for 
China.38 As these figures are increasing much faster in China than in the US, this 
probably means that by now China is already the world leader in terms of  this 
important, albeit only quantitative39 R&D indicator.  
 
In sum, over little more than  one decade, China leapfrogged from an almost 
insignificant role in the global research scenario to that of one of its main 
protagonists. Table 6 compares some key R&D basic statistics in China, the US, 
Japan and  the EU 27. The data presented in the table confirm the extraordinary 
dynamic momentum  of China's R&D effort, and show that China's R&D inputs are 
approaching  an order of magnitude similar to that of the US and EU27.  Table 6.I. 
corroborates the above-mentioned trends on R&D personnel, showing that by 2006 
their number in China was 1.5 million - higher than in Japan and  equivalent to about 
2/3 that of the EU27- and that it was increasing at annual rates much faster than either 
Japan or the EU2740 41.  
 
Overall data on growth rates in total Gross Domestic Expenditures on 
Research and Development  (GERD) show that 2006 and 2007 trends were no 
aberration, and that the overall resources earmarked towards the R&D sector have 
been growing at  much higher rates in China  than in the  US, Japan and the  EU 27  at 
least since the beginning of the 2000s decade. Actually, the average annual compound 
growth rate of GERD in 2002-2007  was over 18% in China, more than five times  
higher than  the correspondent rate in Japan and nine times higher than in the US and 
EU 27 ( see table 6.II.)42. 
 
With respect to the respective role of government and industry, Tables 6.III. 
and 6.IV. show that - contrary to past experience, when research was almost 
completely confined to universities and government research institutes - most  R&D 
activities in China are presently financed  and performed by industry, similarly to  the 
situation prevailing in the advanced capitalist countries. Actually, the share of total 
R&D performed by industrial enterprises in China (71%) is about the same as in the 
US, and higher than that of EU27. In China, however, the role of specialized 
government research institutions (which perform almost 1/5 of total R&D, and 
actually carry out the most advanced and ambitious research programs)43  is more 
relevant than  in the advanced capitalist countries. Conversely, the role of universities 
is correspondently minor.44  
 
The role of the public sector at large in propelling China's unprecedented 
research effort is overwhelming. It has been pointed out that over 70% of China's 
R&D takes place in the industrial sector (the rest being performed by fully public 
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research centres and universities).  An absolute majority of this R&D activity is  
carried out by  enterprises owned or controlled by the state or other public bodies.  
 
Tables 7 and 8 show  a number of  indicators  on R&D activities of Large and 
Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises(LMEs)45, grouped according to their registration 
Status (2007). SOSHEs contribute almost half of the industry's total R&D personnel 
and over 47% of the funds. Adding the (small) R&D contribution of non-state public 
enterprises, both figures increase to well over 50%. The bulk of the remaining R&D 
activities are performed by foreign-owned enterprises, especially by those owned 
mostly by large TNCs and classified by CSY as foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs). 
FFEs fund over 20% of China's industrial research and employ 15% of the R&D 
personnel. The correspondent figures for the other group of FDI-funded enterprises, 
those owned by entrepreneurs from Macao, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, are both less 
than 9%. Fully-owned private domestic enterprises  fund only 7% of the industry's 
R&D effort and employ  8% of the R&D personnel (see table 7). 
 
Mixed enterprises (ME) as a whole fund almost 40% of China's industrial 
research, and employ almost 43% of the R&D personnel. State-holding mixed 
enterprises (SHMEs) is paramount: they contribute about 27% of  China's industry 
R&D funds and personnel, correspondent to over 60% of the total for the ME sub-
sector and to well over half for the SOSHEs sub-set of public-controlled enterprises46. 
Thus, SHMEs constitute the most research-oriented sub-component of  mixed 
enterprises, on one hand, and of  public industry, on the other hand (see Table 8). 
 
These statistical findings allow  us to draw a few stylized conclusions. We saw 
that research centres and universities carry out about 30% of China's total R&D 
activities. State-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises fund over half of the 
rest. Thus, the public sector as a whole funds and performs about 2/3 of China's R&D 
activities. Statistical and descriptive evidence shows that two sub-components of 
public R&D system play a paramount role. One is constituted by government-funded 
research centres, which perform most of the basic research and  truly scientific 
activities47 aimed at approaching or surpassing  top world knowledge standards in a 
number of key areas (see Gabriele and Khan 2008). The other sub-component is that 
of state-holding mixed enterprises, which carry out the bulk of  China's R&D 
activities  in the industrial sector. Most of the remaining R&D activities are carried 
out by foreign-funded enterprises, while the role of the domestic private sector is 
minor. 
 
Therefore, China's national innovation system (NSI) can be seen either as an 
almost fully public system (if only R&D activities performed by domestic agents are 
considered as  really "national"), or as a symbiotic system where a dominant48 
national, mostly  public component interacts with a significant, yet much smaller   
foreign-owned component (see Gabriele and Khan 2008).  
 
We now turn our attention to the tentative interpretation of aggregate 
statistical evidence on R&D inputs and outputs.  Table 9 shows synoptically, for each 
grouping of large and medium-sized industrial enterprises, four basic R&D indicators. 
Two of them are the same input indicators (R&D personnel and expenditure), which 
have been examined above. The other two are output indicators: patent applications 
accepted (PAA) and owning of inventive patients (OIP). The last  four columns of 
table 9  present crude indicators of R&D's productivity. PAA/PERS is the average 
number of patent applications accepted per R&D workers, and PAA/EXP is the 
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average number of patent applications accepted per billion yuan spent. OIP/PERS and 
OIP/EXP are the correspondent productivity indicators relative to the owning of 
inventive patients. 
 
SOSHEs' share of  R&D outputs (both PAA and OIC) is lower than their 
correspondent share of R&D inputs. Consistently, all four R&D productivity 
indicators for SOSHEs are significantly lower than the average for the whole 
industrial sector. With respect to PAA, the stellar performers appear to be share-
holding corporations (SHCs). Some SHC are state-held, and as such they are 
themselves part of the SOESH grouping. However, the data appear to suggest that 
most of the patenting activity of SHCs is carried out by their private-controlled 
subcomponent. SHCs'  R&D inputs  are less than half those of SOSHEs as a whole, 
but their PAA output  is higher. Both R&D productivity indicators  are  three or four 
times higher than those of SOSHEs.  The other category of MEs that of limited 
liability corporations (LLCs), on the contrary, fares rather poorly. It contributes over 
1/3 of total R&D inputs for China's industry as a whole, but it generates only about ¼ 
of PAA and OIP. FFEs - the only other  group of enterprises which, along with 
SOESHs, carries out a significant R&D effort) do only marginally better than 
SOESH,  especially with respect to the PAA/EXP indicator. With respect to OIP, on 
the other hand, SHCs' performance is about average, while the best R&D productivity 
indicators are exhibited by domestic private enterprises and by HKMTs. 
 
These findings are someway puzzling. Those groups of enterprises which are 
most R&D-intensive (mostly SOSHEs, but also FFEs) appear to extract less results in 
terms of patenting activity than those who do very little R&D (DPrivEs and 
HKMTEs), at least in relative terms. One category of mixed enterprises (SHCs) is far 
more effective  in transforming R&D inputs into accepted patent applications than the 
other, that of LLCs. SOEs and state-holding mixed enterprises  appear to perform 
modestly in both tasks. 
 
The most straightforward interpretation of these results is as follows. China's 
public industry is pouring a lot of resources into R&D, but is not very effective/ 
efficient in translating this effort into quantifiable R&D outputs such as patents. 
Moreover, a law of diminishing returns appears to hold, as both public and private 
large and R&D-intensive enterprises fare worse than small domestic and foreign-
owned private firms. 
 
Such an interpretation is, however, not very plausible - especially the second 
part, which would imply to posit  negative scale economies in industrial R&D. Thus, 
we tentatively   advance an alternative one (without fully ruling out that our findings 
might also in fact, to some extent, indicate the existence of a productivity problem  in 
R&D activities carried out by China's state-owned and state-holding enterprises).  
 
The core of this alternative interpretation is that these patent indicators carry a  
limited informative value, and are not very suitable to evaluate the "true" research 
component of R&D activities. Patenting activity in China's industry  is mainly aimed 
at obtaining protection of minor product or process improvements requiring little or 
no scientific research as such, and identifiable mostly only with the "development"  
component of  R&D.49  
 
Other statistical evidence on patents appears to be broadly consistent with our 
tentative interpretation of enterprises' patenting activities. Table 10 reports data on 
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three types of patents50, quite different from each other, granted to all categories of 
agents (i.e., not only domestic enterprises, but also universities, research centres, and 
other official and unofficial domestic organizations and individuals, as well as foreign 
agents51) in the years 1990, 2000, and 2007.  
 
Patenting activities in China have expanded manifold, growing from about 
22000 in 1990 to more than 100000 in 2000 and to over 350000 in 2007. Two types 
of patents, utility models and designs, refer to incremental innovations  belonging to 
the "development" component of R&D activities. Taken together, they constitute the 
large majority of patents, but the relative weight of designs has been increasing, while 
that of utility models  has been declining.  Consistently to their very nature, which is 
directly market-oriented, these innovations are generated almost exclusively by - and 
the correspondent intellectual property rights are granted to -  domestic and foreign 
enterprises (official and non-official). Utility models are patented only by Chinese 
agents, most of them non-official ( probably, small entrepreneurs-innovators). The 
role of larger, official enterprises, however, has being increasing. Designs are also 
granted mostly to Chinese enterprises, while the role of foreigners has been declining, 
suggesting that domestic enterprises of various dimensions are increasingly capable to 
carry out autonomously this kind of innovative activity.   
 
The relative weight of inventions, after declining in the 1990s, has increased 
markedly afterwards, reaching almost 1/5 of the total number of patents granted in 
2007. Moreover, in 1990 less than 1/3 of all invention patents were granted to Chinese 
agents, while now this share is close to 1/2. These trends suggest that during the 
present decade the "quality" of China's R&D activities has been improving, shifting 
progressively towards the basic research end of the continuum, generating more and 
more indigenous inventions and lessening the country's dependency on imported 
foreign technology.52   In this context, the role of enterprises, previously marginal,   
has become quite relevant. Universities and colleges have also increased their relative 
contribution to China's inventing activities during the present decade.  Data in table 
10 do not allow disentangling which share of domestic enterprises' invention patents  
is granted to SOEs and state-holding enterprises. However, we argued above that the 
bulk of the patents granted to privately-owned and (to a lesser extent) privately-
controlled Chinese enterprises are likely to be of the incremental, directly market-
oriented type, and therefore lie towards the "development" end of the R&D range. 
Conversely, by the same token, most of the inventions stemming from China's 
industrial sector are likely to be generated by large, capital- and R&D-intensive SOEs 
and state-holding enterprises, with the rest coming mainly from privately-controlled 
mixed enterprises.  
 
These considerations  make possible to propose an indicative,  back-of-the-
envelope calculation, which confirms the paramount role of the public sector at large 
in generating new technological knowledge in China. Assuming (conservatively) that 
in 2007 only 10% of total inventions patents were granted to SOSHEs (out of a share 
of 19% for enterprises as a whole), and adding to this figure those corresponding to 
universities and colleges (12%) and research institutions (5%), we get 27%. As 
patents granted to Chinese agents are 47% of the total (the rest going to foreigners), 
we can tentatively conclude that the public sector directly generates almost 60% of 
China's indigenous inventions.  It is more likely, however, that the true share is at 
least 2/3, with the rest being contributed by privately-controlled mixed enterprises and 
by more or less informal "non-official" inventors.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The statistical analysis presented in section 3 is based on official data 
published in CSY 2008, and depict the evolution of China's industrial and R&D 
activities up to the year 2007. Our findings are also consistent with less systematic, 
non-academic statistical and analytical sources on the structure, role, and performance 
of public industry and services in China in 2007 and 2008, some of which have been 
reviewed in Section 2 along with other studies on China's industrial sector. 
 
In this paper, we argue that the role of the State (to be understood as a holistic 
term referring to the public  sector as whole), far from being withering out, is in fact 
massive, dominant, and crucial to China's industrial development. Actually, it has 
been strengthened by the successful implementation of the "keep the big dump the 
small" policy, which in turn is consistent with a more general strategy shift towards 
re-centralization in many areas of economic and social policies. This trend that not 
only is still going on, but is inevitably bound to be further accelerated by the massive  
package of fiscal and other interventions made necessary as a response to the world 
financial and economic crisis. 
 
State-owned and state-holding enterprises are now less numerous, but much 
larger, more capital- and knowledge-intensive, more productive and more profitable 
than in the late 1990s. Contrary to popular belief, especially since the mid-2000s, their 
performance in terms of efficiency and profitability compares favourably with that of 
private enterprises. The state-controlled sub-sector constituted by state-holding 
enterprises, in particular, with at its core the 149 large conglomerates managed by 
SASAC, is clearly the most advanced component of China's industry and the one 
where the bulk of in-house R&D activities take place.  
 
The role of the public sector, moreover, goes beyond that of those enterprises 
which are owned or controlled by the State. In the specific Chinese context, many of 
the most advanced formally private industrial enterprises are in fact related to the 
public domain by a web of ownership, financial, and other linkages, to an extent  that 
is qualitatively different and deeper than that of their counterparts in capitalist 
countries. The public sector is paramount in engineering an extraordinary boom in 
S&T and R&D activities (both inside the industrial sector and outside, in universities 
and research centers), and in fuelling a massive investment drive aimed at enhancing 
China's infrastructural and human capital environment. These processes also generate 
major systemic external economies, which are reaped by public and private 
enterprises alike, contributing to abating their operative costs and to sustain their 
competitiveness and profitability. 
 
Contrary to many other analysts, we do not view the dominant role of the state 
in China's industry (and, more generally, in China's economy) as a possibly necessary 
- albeit wasteful - evil, which will be superseded once the transition from a centrally-
planned to a fully capitalist modern economy will be completed. We rather see it as a 
primitive, embryonic, ever-evolving but permanent form of strategic planning aimed 
at fostering industrial development, and as a key distinctive, structural, and pioneering 
characteristic of market socialism. 
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Appendix.    A recent econometric attempt to estimate comparatively 
productivity and efficiency in China's public and private industrial enterprises: 
a critique 
 
Dougherty et al. (2008) analyze a large sample of enterprises covering the 
1998-2003 periods. Their methodology can be summarized as follows. First, they 
construct a Cobb-Douglas production function using "wage-augmented variants"53 
(p.316), including two dummy variables representing scale and ownership type. Then, 
they transform it into log-linear form, and obtain both static and dynamic productivity 
and efficiency estimates, arguing that "… the exponential of the coefficients on the 
dummy variables can be directly interpreted as percent differences in the constant 
term, total factor productivity (TFP). Thus, differences in productivity (in levels or 
growth rates) between directly state controlled companies and various forms of non-
state control are simply the exponential of the estimated coefficients" (p. 317). 
 
Dougherty et al., on the basis of this methodology, estimate TFP levels and 
growth rates of enterprises belonging to different ownership types. Their main finding 
is that enterprises belonging to the domestic private sector (DP) are much more 
efficient than SOEs,  and also than most state-holding enterprises. However, they also 
obtain other results, which portray a more nuanced picture, and show in any case a 
marked improvement of  many profitability indicators of state-holding enterprises. An 
  19 
example is the finding that in state-holding enterprises  the net surplus as a percentage 
of output  grew from 23.2 in 1998 to 34.6 in 2003. These figures are much higher and 
grow faster than those of privately controlled  firms ( 22.2 and 26.2 respectively) (see 
Dougherty et al., 2008,  Table 6 p. 323 )  The capital/output ratio is higher among 
SOSHEs, but it  declined over the period (from 3.8 to 2.9) . In fact, the authors 
concede that "Financial indicators  for state controlled industrial companies show that 
they have made  significant improvements in performance  ……the modest 
improvements in TFP have allowed depreciation charges to fall… As a result, net 
operating surplus has risen markedly, bringing about a near-doubling  in the rate of 
return to physical assets" (p.324). 
 
The main weaknesses of Dougherty et al.'s argument, however, lie in their 
methodology, which presents four main problems.  The first stems from the very 
utilization (in a rather ad hoc fashion) of the TFP concept, which is theoretically 
inconsistent, as has been shown, among others, by Felipe and McCombie (see Felipe 
and McCombie 2005, 2007, 2009). The second is  that the 1998-2003 period was just 
too short to allow for robust dynamic statistical inferences on differential productivity 
and efficiency trends. Moreover, it was also characterized by major  and drastic public 
industry reforms implying high transitional costs, which could not be expected to 
produce fully satisfactory results in the short run.   The third problem is constituted by 
the wage term.54 Dougherty et al. realize that their results are heavily dependent on 
the inclusion of the wage term in the equation: "…the effects of removing the wage 
term on the overall equation are… substantial. In particular, without the wage term, 
the coefficient on labor input declines by a large amount, while it increases on net 
fixed assets. Moreover, the adjusted R-squared drops appreciably under the value 
added specification. Given the stronger explanatory power of the equations that 
include the wage term…our preferred specifications shown above include the wage 
term." (p.322).   
 
The point is that both wage levels in 2003 and their growth rates in the 1998-
2003 period were very uneven across different types of industrial enterprises. Tables 
A 1 and A 2 show that, over the 1998-2003 period, wages in SOEs grew much more 
than in collectives and in the "enterprises of other types of ownership" category. As a 
result, by 2003 SOEs' wages were about the same as in enterprises of other types of 
ownership (they were about ¼ lower in 1998), and 40% higher than in collective 
enterprises. The picture becomes clearer observing wage trends in the various sub-
sectors of the "enterprises of other types of ownership" category (see Table A 2). 
Wage increases were higher in cooperative, mixed (especially so in shareholding 
corporations) and in domestic private enterprises, lower in foreign funded and joint 
ownership enterprises, and even lower in enterprises owned by capitalists from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HKMTEs). As a result, wages in all these sub-categories 
of enterprises lost some ground vis a vis those in SOEs, but the deterioration of 
purchasing power with respect to their SOEs counterparts was particularly severe for 
workers employed  by foreign enterprises and by joint ownership units. Among 
foreign-owned enterprises, moreover, such a relative deterioration was particularly 
pronounced in HKMTEs. The other foreign-funded enterprises (mainly large TNCs) 
were left as the only sub-category paying average wages higher than SOEs55, but this 
wage premium was  eroded by over 20%. 
 
These findings allow us to severely qualify the results on comparative 
productivity and efficiency of public vs. private industrial enterprises obtained by 
Dougherty et al.. In a static framework, the authors' results appear to show that 
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(statically) the most favourable TFP differential accrues to domestic private and 
collectives, most of them SMEs. Actually, however, these were precisely the sectors 
with lowest wages in 200356 .  It is clear that at least a good part of this  supposed 
"efficiency " advantage is simply a reflection of  a very high degree of labor 
exploitation. The story is partly different, however, if we consider FDI-funded 
enterprises.. Most  HKMTEs are  small-to-medium sized, very market-oriented , and 
in 2003 they were paying their workers about the same wages as in SOEs. FFEs, 
however, paid the highest wages, yet were in fact more efficient than other types of 
firms. This finding is, however, far from surprising, taking into account that most 
FFEs are capital- and knowledge-intensive firms belonging to TNCs from advanced 
capitalist countries, which enjoy privileged access to the best state-of-the-art 
technologies and managerial practices. 
 
In a dynamic perspective, a few other observations are warranted. First, as 
already pointed out above, 1998-2003 is a very short period, during which China's 
public industry underwent the first stages of a deep transformation. The size of its 
workforce was dramatically reduced, while wages increased more than the industry's 
average. Wage trends explain at least part of the negative difference in TFP growth 
estimated by Dougherty  et al... Yet, less-than-satisfactory TFP growth in SOSHEs 
during the 1998-2003 period might also in part have been a true phenomenon, 
attributable to a number of factors  related  not only to the  persistence of  many 
traditional inefficiencies typical of  pre-reform SOEs, but also to the rapid pace of 
enterprise reforms and to the difficulties that managers and workers were 
encountering to adapt to the changes. An example can be constituted by workers' 
reaction to dramatic cuts in their enterprise employment levels: it has been 
demonstrated that, at least in some cases, labor shedding - at least in the short term - 
led to a decrease, rather than an increase in labor productivity, due to the demoralizing  
and disrupting effects of  such abrupt organizational changes in collective working 
routines (see Dong and Xu (2008)).  Finally, a comment is worth on a result presented 
by Dougherty  et al.(2008) in Table 4, p.320,, which in our view was not adequately 
emphasized by the authors. Table 4 shows that in firms with over 1000 workers not 
only TFP was higher than in other types of enterprises, but was increasing at a much 
faster rate.  The point is simply that most of these enterprises are SOSHEs, and the 
very fact that the state is hegemonic among this vanguard group of industrial 
enterprises, and obviously able to exploit to a substantial extent their  huge economies 
of scale potential, shows that an overall interpretative thread equating public  property 
and control with low productivity and inefficiency should be taken with a grain of 
salt. 
 
The last problem is the inclusion of the scale  dummy. While formally correct, 
this dummy has the effect of exceedingly penalizing the estimate of "TFP" among 
SOEs and SOSHEs, which were already  relatively larger (on average) than domestic 
private firms57 in 1998, and have been growing progressively larger and less 
numerous over the 1998-2003 period  as result of the rapid and drastic 
implementation  of the  "keep the big dump the small"   policy.  Economies of scale  
are indeed  huge, and they are mostly reaped by large SOSHEs and FFEs.. Thus,  
measuring an abstract concept of TFP  which excludes the economies of scale points 
towards a narrow, static idea of productivity. Such a productivity concept is based on 
the obsession about static allocative efficiency, and ignores the crucial importance of 
the systemic and dynamic productivity gains that can only be reaped enlarging  the 
average size of firms and endowing them with ever-increasing physical and human 
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capital and technology - which is after all the very reason why big capitalist TNCs 
exist and (usually) prosper. 
 
This narrowly conceived TFP is therefore a flawed measure of true 
productivity, and therefore it is not surprising that it ends up glorifying the 
supposedly- superior performance of China's domestic private firms. The existence of 
the indigenous small-scale private sector, with its important industrial component, is 
indispensable for China in its present stage of development, as neither the state nor 
the large foreign TNCs would  be in a position to create each year as many millions of 
jobs as private entrepreneurs do - or, if this were the case, could only do it at the price 
of  paying a real, enormous price in terms of waste and inefficiency, thereby 
jeopardizing the whole of China's development path. Yet, private industrial firms 
should not be unduly idealized. Most of them are small, undercapitalized, and 
technologically backward. They only survive because they pay extremely low wages, 
and often engage in hyper-exploitative and illegal forms of absolute surplus value 
extraction, such as blackmailing workers and forcing them to accept extremely long 
working hours and/or the partial non-payment of their direct and indirect labour 
compensations.  
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Notes 
                                                
1
 For a thorough discussion on  the conceptual and   definitional complexities related to the use of terms 
such as "market socialism" and "socioeconomic formation", see Gabriele and Schettino 2008. 
2
 Systemic external economies stem from the ability of individual firms to externalize a number of 
costs - such as infrastructure building and maintenance, human capital formation, access to free and 
quasi-free (less-than-fully-protected) knowledge, environmental protection - which otherwise they 
should have born directly.  Some of these external economies are far from virtuous from a social 
welfare perspective, such as those resulting in environmental damages. However, on balance, in most 
countries they  favour industrial development, or at least industrial growth. They are called systemic 
because they are predicated on a number of systemic factors which lie outside the scope of the firm's 
behaviour. these factors, in turn, ultimately depend on the State's willingness and capability to macro-
manage strategically the development path of the national economy. Systemic external economies are 
particularly relevant and crucial in China, consistently with the unique role played by the public sector. 
3
 The preminent role of private enterprises as industrial employment generators is being  severely  
weakened by the impact of the international economic crisis. However, the present  retrenchment  of 
private industry is probably a temporary phenomenon.  
4
 On the intrinsic weaknesses of the TFP concept see the Appendix. 
5
 There are two main groups of  FDI- owned/ controlled industrial enterprises  (jointly referred to as 
FDI-funded enterprises, FDIEs)  in China. One is that of enterprises owned/ controlled by capitalists 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HKMTEs). The remaining FDIEs , mainly controlled by large 
TNCs from the most advanced capitalist countries, constitute the group of foreign-funded enterprises 
(FFEs). See below, Section 3.  
6
 SOEs operating in competitive sectors appear to have performed better than others. In the ICT sector 
(the most competitive high-tech sector in China), in particular, SOEs' efficiency gap vis-à-vis FFEs is 
quite small. 
7
 An additional factor is probably constituted by the transitional costs of adapting to new forms of labor 
allocation and organization on the part of both workers and managers. 
8
 See below, Section 3.. 
9
 "90 percent of some 5,000 university-affiliated enterprises are wholly owned by the state, 
thus, ultimate responsibility should be theoretically held by the state. In reality, however, universities 
have substantial freedom over the management of their affiliated enterprises… the complexity 
concerning the ownership of university-affiliated enterprises straddling over respective universities and 
the state has not been fully solved   university-affiliated enterprises are categorized as state-owned, 
thus, equities in those enterprises should fully belong to the state. However, the registration of those 
enterprises has a lot of ambiguity. " (Sunami  2002). Not surprisingly, such increasingly complex forms 
of indirect public ownership and control are not immune from problems. 
 
10
 Fisher-Vanden, and  Jefferson  (2008) distinguish three types  of  technical change: autonomous, in-
house R&D-led, and purchases of imported technologies. Autonomous technical change is associated 
with the passage of time and the accumulation of new vintages of plant, equipment, and workers that 
embody new technologies, without requiring  R&D (Fisher-Vanden and  Jefferson 2008, p. 659). 
11
 The redundant workers were partially cushioned from the negative consequences of the loss of 
employment by various welfare measures.  
12
 The zhuada fangxiao policy was formally adopted by the State Council in 1995. 
13
 Naughton refers to the state share of total profits, both in SOEs proper and in state-holding mixed 
enterprises. 
14
 Over 2/3 of the total is generated by just  nine firms: PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, China Mobile, 
China Telecom, Baosteel, Chinalco, Shenhua Energy, and the State Electricity Grid. 
15
 SASAC walked an important step in this direction in late 2007, when itbegan collecting dividends 
from its firms. 
16
 This figure refers to August, 2008 (source: Ministry of Commerce , 2008), and might be further 
reduced by the time this article is published. 
 
17
 The pace of SOEs reforms accelerated since the late 1990s.y in place, 1998-2003 saw the most rapid 
phase of SOE reform. 
 
18
 SASAC has also strengthened managerial incentives."In 2004, all central SASAC firms signed three-
year performance contracts, outlining annual and three-year targets. On the basis of these contracts, 
SASAC evaluates each CEO’s performance. The three-year evaluation criteria are based on growth of 
capital value and revenues as well as annual profit results. 
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19
 "Three national oil companies produce all of China’s oil and gas; four telecom companies provide all 
basic telecom services; three airline companies carry 82% of the domestic air passengers. These 
companies enjoy enough protection that they can earn rich profits, but not so much protection than they 
can enjoy a “quiet life,” the ultimate, stagnant reward of a pure monopolist. In a few sectors, large, 
centrally-run flagship firms operate in a fiercer competitive environment. Baosteel and Chinalco have 
the most expensive and sophisticated production technologies in their sectors, and are moving out on to 
the global stage" (Naughton 2008, p.2). 
20
 The present Chaebol-like ownership structure  allows to overcome many of the contradictions  that 
plagued the decision-making process in traditional SOEs,  which had to follow directives  emanating 
from several state and government bodies resulting in  unclear lines of authority . 
21
 The 149 central SASAC-run groups control over 40% of state enterprise assets, over ½ of revenues, 
and almost 2/3 of profits. These figures are similar, or higher, than the correspondent ones for the 500 
largest SOEs in 1995. 
 
22
 Kroeber (2008)also presents tentative aggregate estimates for services sector, concluding that in that 
macro-sector as well "state firms are fewer in number than private firms , but are on average  far larger 
and hold all the plum spots" (p.40). Domestic private firms are over 60% of the total, but generate only 
27% of services' profits. Conversely, SOSHEs are about 1/3 of all services firms in number, but reap 
almost 2/3 of profits. SOSHEs capture almost all the revenue generated by  their of the financial 
(insurance and banking)  sectors, where they exert a virtually absolute dominance, over ½ in most other 
services sectors and over 40% even in quite competitive and market-driven sectors such as hotel and 
catering and It and software services (p.41).  
 
 
23
 This policy shift was already apparent before the launching of a massive public expenditure drive in 
late 2008, to counteract the collapse in export demand caused by the international economic crisis. 
Largely out of necessity, but also due to the  resilience exhibited so far by state-owned/controlled 
industrial firms  vis a vis the parlous state of  many privately-owned domestic export-oriented 
manufacturers, the new spending programmes will further strengthen the role of the State. This change 
in the public/private relative relation of forces is concentrated in the areas of infrastructure, R&D, and 
other services. The long overdue expansion of the role of the public sector as non-market provider of 
basic services is particularly consistent with the long-run goals of creating a "harmonious society" 
advocated by China's leadership. 
24
 Of course, all SOECGs  belong to the larger grouping of  SOSHEs. Even if the authors consider them 
as de facto SOEs, notwithstanding their modern and diversified ownership structure,  they are classified 
as "state-holding" rather than "state-owned" enterprises in CSY 2008. 
25
 It might be argued that enterprises -such as cooperatives and collectives - that are owned and self-
managed by workers are in fact non-private organizations, but cannot be considered "public". The 
reason would be that  they ultimately   do not behave to maximize the welfare function of local or 
national governments (which can be assumed to reflect, albeit imperfectly, the interests of the local or 
national population as a whole), but only those of  the workers themselves. In practice, this objection 
carries little weight in China, because cooperatives and collectives are rarely fully autonomous and 
operate in close connection with local governments. In any case, their relative importance is modest. 
 
 
26
 The task of disentangling the relative weight and characteristics of public and private 
industry respectively  along various significant dimensions (i.e., number, production, investment, 
productivity, profitability, etc.) has been greatly simplified by the 1998 statistical reform (see Holz and 
Lin 2001), but still requires a certain amount of interpretation of available data.   
 
27
 To a considerable extent, the speed of the relative decline of public industry is overstated by  
statistical data, because it is a known fact that many small public firms (most of them TVEs) were 
already de facto privately owned/controlled, at least by the  early 1990s, and subsequently registered as 
private (thereby giving up their "red hat") when this became more politically  acceptable (see Holz and 
Lin 2001). This transition, however, was basically completed by the early2000s. 
2828
 Of course, the indicators including the capital term shall be seen as indicative, as they compare a 
stock variable (the total asset endowment owned by enterprises in a certain moment of time, as a result 
of  an accumulation process which usually lasted  for several years and was not homogeneous  across 
different firms)  with flow variables such as labour force, output, and profits, each of which refers to a 
specific year. 
29
 Statistical data always refer to enterprises over a minimum size. 
  28 
                                                                                                                                       
30
 Excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan-funded enterprises,  These enterprises are on average 
much smaller, less capitalized, and less productive than  their counerparts owned by large TNCs from 
developed countries. 
31
 A relatively high K/O ratio is not incompatible with the existence of economies of scale and is not 
necessarily a symptom of inefficiency in a static context. Very large enterprises can achieve a very high 
labour productivity,  which is the very essence of industrial development. To do so, they usually 
require a lot of capital investment. In a dynamic framework, it is possible, in theory - but rarely  
feasible in practice - to pursue a fully virtuous pattern of technical progress  where more  production  is 
achieved with less labour and less capital. The key issue is whether or not the continuous accumulation 
of capital (which might cause an ever-rising K/O ratio) is checked by a sufficiently rapid technical 
progress, thereby rendering sustainable the industrial development path in the long run. Such a 
dynamic path sustainability is not incompatible with an ever-rising endowment of capital per worker, 
which constitutes by itself a normal feature of economic growth. 
32
 As previously noticed, SHMEs are also very profitable. It is interesting to note that the difference in 
the respective profit/assets ratios  between two  very different groupings of enterprises such as   
SHMEs and PrivDEs is less than 2%. 
33
 The difference is less than 6%. 
34
 In Marxian terms, under ceteris paribus conditions, a higher organic composition implies a lower 
profit rate. Neoclassical theory also predicts that the profit rate shall decrease if the K/O ratio increases, 
due to a decline in the marginal productivity of capital. 
35
 Each of these two sub-groups of SOSHE sis constituted by about 10000 enterprises. 
36
 In nominal terms. 
37
 The number of S&T personnel in state-owned enterprises and institutions also kept increasing, more 
than doubling  during the 1990s (see CSY 2008, table 20.44). 
38
 According to China's own statistics (which are not fully comparable with OECD ones), the number 
of Scientists and Engineers engaged in R&D activities reached over 3.2 million by 2007, correspondent 
to about 1.7 million full-time equivalent man-years  (source: CSY 2008, table 20.38). 
39
 Although  the gap is difficult to estimate  properly,  the professional quality of China's researchers is 
considered to be still lower than that of those of  the US and of other advanced OECD countries (see 
Gabriele and Khan 2008). 
40
 Data on the growth rates of R&D personnel in the US are not available in OECD 2008b. 
41
 The  caveat mentioned  in Note 39 applies also to the data in table 6. 
42
 Available preliminary information indicates that this expanding trend continued unabated after 2007.                   
In his  report delivered  to the National People's Congress on March 3, 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao 
stated that  central government expenditure on S&T activities grew by 16.4% in 2008, and  were 
expected to  increase by over 25% in 2009  (Chinaview 2009-03-05)  
43
 See Gabriele and Khan 2008. 
44
 In the US and in EU27 there is also a fourth actor, the private non-business sector, which plays a 
complementary role. Such a sector in non-existent in China's research scenario.  
45
 In China, almost all R&D  is carried out by LMEs. 
46
 Other figures in Table 8 further confirm the paramount role of also shows   
47
 The term basic research should be understood in a broad sense, relative to the Chinese reality. 
Activities  classified as basic in China might  be regarded as non-basic in more advanced countries.   
48
 These observations are based on quantitative input indicators. It might be the case that, in some 
industrial sector, the effectiveness and quality of R&D activities performed by foreign-owned 
enterprises is superior to that carried out by public Chinese enterprises, universities, and research 
centres.   
49
 This is particularly true for the OIP indicator. The findings on the PAA indicators can also be 
interpreted along these lines, but with some more difficulty. The exceptional  role played by SHCs, in 
particular, appears to require further research. 
 
50
 Data on patents in tables 7, 9, and 10 are not homogeneous and therefore not directly comparable.  
51
 CSY 2008 does not specify clearly what the term "official" means. However, domestic unofficial 
agents are probably individuals and/or firms or other organization too small to be considered" official". 
 
52
 The requirements needed for granting invention patents vary from country to country, even in the 
OECD. It is quite likely that in China they are less stringent than in most d advanced capitalist 
countries. What we are focusing on here are the trends which are unfolding over time.   
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53
 "Wage-augmented variants are used in the preferred specification due to concerns about the quality 
of the measure of employment (total headcount), and the presence of large wage gaps across different 
types of firms. These gaps suggest that private firms either hire much more qualified workers or they 
utilize higher wages to deter shirking and improve incentives using efficiency wages (see Akerlof and 
Yellen 1986)". (p 316 ). The reader might inadvertently understand that private firms in China  pay 
higher wages than their public counterparts, but this is not the case ( the authors refer simply to the 
classic theoretical model on efficiency wages  developed by Akerlof & Yellen over 20 years ago, 
which obviously does not contain  data on future Chinese wages). Actually, as we show in this 
appendix, the opposite is true. 
54
 To some extent, this problem also stems from another of the  theoretical flaws of the TFP concept, 
which assumes a priori that production factors are remunerated according to their respective marginal 
productivities. The derivation of TFP from this crucial assumption inevitably mixes up two very 
different levels of the analysis, that of  production (axed on the quantitative relationship between inputs 
and outputs) and that of income distribution  (between labor force  buyers and sellers). 
55
 These data clearly support the "efficiency wages" argument in the case of FFE, but not in other types 
of privately-owned/controlled enterprises.. 
56
 The differential was  40% for UCs  (Table A1) and 27% for domestic private enterrises (Table A 2) 
57
 The authors note that the private sector is composed mainly by small and medium enterprises, and 
that this well-known fact is reflected also in the firms included in their sample ( p. 316). 
 
